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Abstract
We show that the investments of ex ante ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms are more profoundly aﬀected
by changes in credit supply than the investments of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. We employ a survey
of Norwegian private ﬁrms concerning the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9, linked to ﬁrm-level
ﬁnancial and bank accounts. Adverse changes in credit availability reduce investments after controlling
for output demand, and this eﬀect is largest for the least ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. This is consis-
tent with a model where ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms hedge against cash ﬂow shortfalls whilst ex ante
unconstrained ﬁrms rely on access to external funds.
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1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis of the years 2008-9 rejuvenated interest in the role of banks in the real economy,
and how ﬁrms' ﬁnancial constraints can aﬀect the business cycle through reduced ﬁxed asset investments.
Recent contributions, including Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy
(2010), document the relationship between credit constraints and reductions in ﬁrm investments during the
ﬁnancial crisis. In this paper, we employ Norwegian survey data, where we link each ﬁrm responding to a
survey to its corresponding accounting data, to document such a relationship in Norway during the 2008-9
ﬁnancial crisis. The survey was collected from a representative, random sample of mainly non-listed small
and medium-sized ﬁrms. We focus on two questions: (1) Did reductions in credit availability during the
crisis the aﬀect ﬁrms' investments after controlling for changes in their creditworthiness? (2) At which ex
ante level of ﬁnancial constraints are changes in credit availability during the crisis more likely to aﬀect
ﬁrms' investments?
The second question emphasises that the largest changes in ﬁnancial constraints due to an external credit
supply shock may not necessarily be concentrated among the ﬁrms with the highest levels of ﬁnancial
constraints. This distinction between level and change of ﬁnancial constraints has not been thoroughly
studied in prior literature. Previous papers, ranging from Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) to Duchin et al. (2010)
implicitly make the assumption that more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are also more negatively aﬀected by
adverse shocks, and use correlations between credit and investment for these ﬁrms as evidence of a causal
link from ﬁnancial frictions to real investments. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) present a theory
model where the ﬁrms with the largest agency problems receive a relatively lower share of aggregate credit
when economic activity deteriorates. However, it is not obvious that more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms ex
ante should also be more aﬀected by a negative shock to credit availability, when taking into account that
they already start out being more constrained. That is, the ex ante most ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are
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not necessarily the marginal borrowers when a crisis occurs. We present a stylised theoretical framework to
illustrate this point, where ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially constrained are more inclined to use current resources to
hedge their future funding needs against income shortfalls, and are therefore less reliant on having access to
new external credit at some future point in time. Thus, even though the economic costs of underinvestment
in ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are larger than for less constrained ﬁrms, it is not clear that the most
constrained ﬁrms are also the most important for the interaction and inﬂuence of ﬁnancial constraints on
business cycle dynamics.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9 provides a unique event to study the eﬀects of a sudden economic and
ﬁnancial shock on small ﬁrm ﬁnance. We show that changes in credit availability have real eﬀects on
the ﬁrms' investments after controlling for changes in demand for their products and services. We then
show that more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are less aﬀected by reduced credit availability compared to
less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Our analysis uses detailed microeconomic ﬁrm-level data from Norway.
We combine proprietary survey data from a sample of randomly selected, representative ﬁrms that were
asked about their ﬁrm's experience of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9, with an extensive data set containing
Norwegian non-listed ﬁrms' bank accounts and ﬁnancial accounts. The survey sample ﬁrms were selected
based on random draws of ﬁrms from Norwegian register data, which ensured that there was no selection
bias at this stage. A comparison of ﬁrms that responded and ﬁrms that did not also suggests no material
selection bias.
The survey asks the ﬁrms' top managers whether the ﬁrm's credit availability changed due to the ﬁnancial
crisis, i.e. not about their absolute levels of credit availability. We therefore have a direct identiﬁcation of
changes in credit availability. The observed outcome of actual credit granted is determined by the interaction
of supply and demand. Our variable measures credit supply directly, hence we avoid this simultaneity
problem. This credit supply information distinguishes our study from most of the previous literature,
which must rely on indirect measures of credit availability obtained from sources such as accounting data.
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The ability to identify supply directly is particularly useful when analysing the credit market. An extensive
theory literature, starting with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), has shown that credit supply is generally not a
monotonically increasing function of the interest rate. This is because a higher interest rate can increase
the riskiness of the pool of ﬁrms that apply for bank loans, and thus reduces the bank lenders' expected
proﬁtability on lending to these ﬁrms. In addition, other contract terms such as collateral, covenants and
maturity imply that the price of a loan is multidimensional. Taken together, this complexity makes few
structural models of credit supply applicable for empirical testing.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9 did not originate within the Norwegian economy, but was imported from
abroad, primarily through Norwegian banks' funding from the international interbank markets. The banks'
situation was particularly challenging in October 2008, when even the largest Norwegian bank, DnB NOR,
had severe funding problems. The Norwegian government then decided to increase the banks' access to
borrow government bonds in order to improve the banks' liquidity. However, declines in oil prices and
global business conﬁdence also led to reduced export demand for Norwegian ﬁrms, which means that the
crisis was not a pure, exogenous shock to credit supply. We therefore need to control for changes in demand
for the ﬁrms' products and services in our analyses.
When a ﬁrm reports being more constrained in its access to credit during the ﬁnancial crisis, this
may either be because the bank is more reluctant to lend to the ﬁrm due to the ﬁrm's prospects having
deteriorated, or that the bank's funding problems have reduced its ability to supply credit to the ﬁrm. In
the ﬁrst situation, the reduction in credit availability follows from ﬁrms having fewer positive NPV projects
available. This leads to a positive correlation between investments and reported credit availability, even
though the causality goes from investments to credit, and not the other way. The alternative story is that
there exists a credit channel, where the banks' diﬃculties in obtaining funding reduce their abilities to
grant loans (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In this situation, a ﬁrm may experience lower access to credit
even if its investment opportunities are unchanged. Our survey contains questions about how the ﬁrms'
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demand was aﬀected. A reduction in demand for a ﬁrm's output (sales) during the crisis is likely to have
a negative eﬀect on its creditworthiness. We can use the answers to these questions to control for changes
in the ﬁrms' creditworthiness due to reduced demand. We also link the survey data responses to a panel
data set containing the survey ﬁrms' ﬁnancial accounts and bank accounts.
The extent to which ﬁrms are aﬀected by an exogenous shock to credit availability depends on the
ﬁrms' dependence on external ﬁnancing, as well as their dynamic ﬁnancing behaviour prior to the crisis.
In particular, ﬁrms fearing that their ability to borrow to ﬁnance new projects will be reduced in states
of the world where the ﬁrm experiences cash ﬂow shortfalls, will want to hedge this risk by, e.g. holding
more cash ex ante (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). In
this paper, we show in a stylised theory model that in a crisis, the investments of these ﬁrms will be less
negatively aﬀected by reduced credit supply because they draw on their cash balances or existing credit
lines to ﬁnance their investments. The ﬁrms that must reduce investments during a crisis are those who
expect to fund their investments by external borrowing whenever a new investment opportunity arises. We
provide empirical evidence that supports our model.
This paper sets out to answer two speciﬁc questions. First, we study the link between credit constraints
and ﬁrm investments. We have the ﬁrms' survey answers to questions regarding whether they experienced
a change in credit availability and whether they changed their investments, and we use answers to ques-
tions concerning ﬁrm demand as control variables. Thus, our ﬁrst contribution is to show that there is a
relationship between changes in credit availability and ﬁrm investment even when we control for changes
in the ﬁrms' creditworthiness.
Our second and main objective is to investigate whether ﬁrms that are the most or least ex ante ﬁnancially
constrained are more likely to reduce investments due to reduced access to credit. This is a topic that has
received less attention in previous literature. We use several standard measures of ﬁnancial constraints. We
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ﬁnd that the least constrained ﬁrms experience the most negative changes in investments due to reduced
credit supply. A possible reason for this is that ﬁrms that are already ﬁnancially constrained are better
prepared for an adverse crisis, and are thus less aﬀected when that crisis occurs. Less ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms, however, probably expect credit to be continuously available either from banks or the debt markets,
and are thus more aﬀected by a disruption in these external sources of ﬁnance, such as the one that occurred
in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9.1 Previous research, e.g. Campello et al. (2010) and Duchin et al. (2010),
has often assumed that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are more aﬀected than less ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms by systematic exogenous changes in ﬁnancial constraints. Our ﬁndings suggest that this assumption
may not be justiﬁed. Becker and Ivashina (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2011) implicitly assume that large
ﬁrms can substitute market debt or equity for bank debt when banks are forced to contract lending, which
should make them less sensitive to changes in the supply of bank credit. Our results, where large, albeit
non-listed, ﬁrms are more aﬀected than smaller ﬁrms by changes in credit availability, suggest that this
assumption may not necessarily be true.2 Our analysis of smaller ﬁrms than the conventional data sets of
listed U.S. ﬁrms is also a supplement to the understanding of ﬁnancial constraints.
1.1 The Financial Crisis in Norway
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9 had relatively mild eﬀects on the Norwegian economy compared to other
developed economies (NOU2011:1, 2011). Still, the ﬁnancial system experienced problems in October 2008
due to its linkages with the international interbank market. The Norwegian economy was in recession from
the third quarter of 2008 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The fall in GDP for mainland Norway3 from 2008
to 2009 was only about one percent, compared to around four percent for the EU and two percent for the
1The survey question uses the term "credit availability" without specifying the source of credit.
2In our sample of 1,248 ﬁrms, only ﬁve are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and only three ﬁrms have exchange-traded
market debt.
3Mainland Norway GDP excludes the oﬀshore oil and gas activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
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U.S. From October 2008 to June 2009 Norges Bank, Norway's central bank, reduced its key interest rate
from 5.75 percent to 1.25 percent. This, together with an expansive ﬁscal policy, probably contributed to
the downturn in Norway being relatively mild.
Figure 1 shows the development of the seasonally-adjusted (log) GDP of mainland Norway from 1978
to 2011. The graph shows a clear reduction in GDP during late 2008 and early 2009. The GDP reduction
is even more marked than the recession in 1990, which is considered the biggest economic crisis in Norway
since the Second World War. Figure 2 shows the development of Norwegian corporate bankruptcies for
the years 1999-2011.4 The number of bankruptcies increased dramatically from the summer of 2008 to
the summer of 2009. This increase is comparable to the economic downturn of the early 2000s, when the
number of bankruptcies increased more slowly, but then stayed at an elevated level for a prolonged period.
Taken together, these two ﬁgures clearly show a marked turnaround in the business cycle in Norway
during 2008, and support our presumption that this period constituted a signiﬁcant, adverse economic
event.
1.2 Related Literature
The impact of bank credit and ﬁnancial constraints on the real economy has been studied extensively.
Standard references for a general overview include Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Tirole (2006) and Freixas
and Rochet (2008 (2nd ed.). An early empirical paper studying this topic is Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
They argue that following a tightening of monetary policy, both manufacturing activity and bank loans
decline more for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms, which partly increase their use of commercial paper
debt. Peek and Rosengren (2000) show that loan supply shocks in Japan, which were transmitted to North
America through the presence of Japanese banks there, impacted on real economic activity in the U.S.
4This ﬁgure only includes bankruptcies of limited liability ﬁrms, and excludes ﬁnancial and certain non-commercial indus-
tries.
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Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show the linkage between bank funding and lending in the U.S. during
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, in that banks relying on deposit ﬁnancing cut their lending less, and that banks
co-syndicating with Lehman Brothers reduced lending to a greater extent after its bankruptcy.
A challenge of early papers in the ﬁeld was a lack of detailed data at the level of individual ﬁrms. In
recent years, increasing access to better-quality data, combined with credit market shocks, has produced
papers that study credit and ﬁnancial constraints at the micro level. For instance, Gan (2007) uses the land
price collapse in Japan in the early 1990s to investigate how a shock to ﬁrms' collateral values inﬂuences
their debt capacity and investments. She ﬁnds that ﬁrms with greater collateral losses reduce investment
more and obtain smaller amounts of credit after the collapse. Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show that
borrowers at U.S. banks who were exposed to the Russian default crisis in 1998 suﬀered reduced valuation
and lower performance relative to other ﬁrms. Crisis-aﬀected banks reduced the quantity of their lending
and increased their interest rates after the crisis compared to unaﬀected banks.
Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) ﬁnd that corporate investment declined following the start of the 2008-
9 ﬁnancial crisis. They only observe actual credit volumes during the crisis, and thus cannot disentangle
the eﬀects of supply and demand. In our paper, survey respondents are asked speciﬁcally about changes
in credit supply, and we can therefore test the relationship between credit supply and investments more
directly. Duchin et al. (2010) show that ﬁrms with low cash reserves and/or high short term debt prior
to the crisis experienced larger declines in investment. The authors interpret this as evidence in favour
of a 'precautionary savings motive' for cash to insure ﬁrms against unexpected liquidity shocks. This is
consistent with the point made by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), who argue that ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms save cash to hedge against potential future funding constraints. Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2007) create a theoretical model where cash plays an important role in hedging future investment
against income shortfalls. We investigate this idea further in our paper by linking the hedging motive to
the extent ﬁrms expect to have uninterrupted access to external ﬁnance.
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In another ﬁnancial crisis-related paper, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey 1,050 Chief
Financial Oﬃcers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia on how credit constraints aﬀected their ﬁrms
during the 2008 crisis. They show that ﬁrms that reported being ﬁnancially constrained also planned to cut
technology, marketing, and capital expenditures, and that constrained ﬁrms reduced their cash holdings
more, drew more on their credit lines, and sold assets. We also have survey data with ﬁrms' reported changes
in credit availability due to the crisis. Our key survey question relates to changes in credit availability,
rather than its level, due to the crisis. Campello et al. (2010) show that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms must
restrict investment due to being ﬁnancially constrained both prior to and during the crisis. They do not,
however, directly test the eﬀect of changes in credit supply on investment due to the crisis. The eﬀect of
ﬁnancial constraints on the business cycle are driven by the extent that ﬁnancial constraints change during
the cycle. If ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are equally constrained during booms and busts, their access to
credit should not have a large eﬀect on the business cycle. By focusing on this question, our paper explores
how ﬁnancing frictions are related to the aggregate business cycle.
Other papers studying the recent ﬁnancial crisis include Carvalho, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) and Kahle
and Stulz (2011). While Carvalho et al. (2011) ﬁnd a relationship between bank-speciﬁc shocks and ﬁrm
borrowers, Kahle and Stulz (2011) argue that the behaviour of U.S. ﬁrms during the crisis is better explained
by demand factors than by a credit supply shock.
Another strand of literature studies corporate liquidity. In a survey of CFOs, Lins, Servaes, and Tufano
(2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms use cash to hedge against future cash ﬂow shortfalls in bad times, while credit lines
are used for ﬁnancing good business opportunities in good times. Campello, Giambona, Graham, and
Harvey (2011) show that cash and credit lines are used as substitutes when ﬁrms manage liquidity. These
papers' ﬁndings show that liquidity management strategies vary across both ﬁrms and time. Using a one-
dimensional measure, e.g. cash, as a proxy for liquidity is thus likely to be too narrow. In our empirical
strategy we therefore do not study liquidity management directly. Instead, we look at how changes in credit
9
availability aﬀect investments as an indirect indication of how ﬁrms manage liquidity to hedge against future
cash ﬂow shortfalls.
In addition to the previously mentioned contributions of our paper, we add to the knowledge concerning
small ﬁrms' credit availability during the crisis. Most existing studies focus on large, listed ﬁrms, while
almost all ﬁrms in our sample are small and unlisted. Such ﬁrms constitute a major share of the economy,
and they are arguably more dependent on bank ﬁnancing than larger, listed ﬁrms are.
2 Theory
2.1 The Model
In this section we present a stylised theory model to illustrate the hypotheses that we test in the empirical
section. The model is based on the framework in Chapter 5 of Tirole (2006), and builds on the insights of
Almeida et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2007). The purpose of the model is to illuminate how ﬁnancing
constraints cause a demand for hedging against future cash ﬂow shortfalls, and to show that this hedging
demand is likely to be more important for the most ex ante ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
The model has three dates, where time is denoted t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The timing of the model is illustrated
in Figure 3. All agents are risk neutral. A ﬁrm has access to an investment opportunity at date 0. This
investment costs a ﬁxed amount I0. This ﬁxed size investment is a natural way to model small ﬁrms, which
typically do not have enough investment projects in a given year to make a continuous approximation of
their aggregate investment opportunities appropriate. The payoﬀ is realised in period 2, and is equal to R0
with probability p (successful state of the world) and 0 with probability 1 − p (unsuccessful state of the
world). This investment has a strictly positive net present value. We normalise the interest rate to zero,
which gives us pR0 > I0. The ﬁrm has limited liability, meaning that its payoﬀ in any state cannot be
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lower than zero.
At the intermediary date 1, an additional investment opportunity arises. This investment opportunity is
only available if the initial date-0 investment has been made. Thus, the ﬁrm does not make an investment
choice between the date-0 and date-1 projects. The cost of this intermediate investment is random, given
by the random variable I˜1. One way to interpret this randomness is that a ﬁrm may face an income shortfall
at the intermediate date, which increases its 'net' investment expenditure (investment outlays minus cash
ﬂow from operations) and thus its intermediary ﬁnancing need. The intermediate investment's payoﬀ is R1,
and its payoﬀ is realised at date 2 only in the successful state of the world. I˜1 is randomly distributed with
distribution function F (I1) and density function f(I1). We assume that the investment is always socially
proﬁtable, and that F (0) = 0 and F (I1) > 0, ∀I1 > 0. The realised value of I˜1 is revealed to everybody at
date 1, and this realised outcome is denoted by I1.
The ﬁrm has no initial internal resources at date 0 that can be used for ﬁnancing purposes, and it therefore
requires external funding to undertake its investment projects. Due to agency problems or incomplete
contracts issues, external lenders may in some situations be unable to write a contract under which they
obtain a large enough share of the investment payoﬀ to achieve nonnegative expected proﬁts. Therefore,
some positive NPV-projects may not be funded if this problem is suﬃciently large. For simplicity, we do
not model these agency costs explicitly, but instead denote by k the fraction of date 2 investment payoﬀ
that can be pledged to external ﬁnanciers, with k ∈ [k, 1]. k determines whether a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially
constrained, with the level of ﬁnancial constraints being given by 1− k, and k = 1 implies that the ﬁrm is
not constrained. The more ﬁnancially constrained a given ﬁrm becomes, the higher the proﬁtability of its
marginal intermediate investment project will have to be, and it is thus more likely to underinvest relative
to a ﬁrst-best outcome. For example, a young ﬁrm with few collateralisable assets may have a low value of
k, making ﬁnancing more diﬃcult for this ﬁrm. Since our focus here is to illustrate what happens at the
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intermediate date, we simplify and consider only ﬁrms that are able to ﬁnance their initial investment:
pkR0 ≥ I0 ⇒ k = I0
pR0
(1)
The ﬁrm can either ﬁnance its investments by borrowing I0 + Iˆ
0
1 at date 0 and save Iˆ
0
1 as cash until date 1,
or borrow I0 at date 0 and I1 at date 1 after the realised value of I˜1 has been revealed. Saving cash is
ineﬃcient, however, as holding cash to invest may lead to ineﬃcient investments (Jensen, 1986). Borrowing
from external lenders at date 1 leads to increased scrutiny and monitoring prior to receiving such loans,
and the ﬁrm is thus unable to invest ineﬃciently. Having available cash, on the other hand, may create
this problem. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that ﬁrm managers are unable to perfectly align
their incentives with the ﬁnanciers, an assumption of agency problems that is one of the central themes
studied in corporate ﬁnance research. In our model, the deadweight cost of investing with cash-at-hand
equals θI1, where θ > 0 is a constant, and the cost is therefore proportional to the size of the realised
intermediate investment I1. If the ﬁrm does not invest at date 1, the cash is paid back to the lenders
without incurring a cost. One rationale behind this assumption is that larger investments are often more
complex and therefore provide more opportunities for ineﬃciencies. In addition, the model investment can
be interpreted as being net of cash ﬂows, such that the deadweight cost is also proportional to the ﬁrm's
operating expenses. We assume that the deadweight cost is bounded such that it is still socially eﬃcient
to invest even when incurring this cost. For all feasible date 1-investment values, I1, we therefore have
pR1 ≥ I1(1 + θ)⇒ I1 ≤ pR
1
1 + θ
(2)
Since the cost of holding cash from date 0 to date 1 occurs when some cash is used for investment, irrespective
of how much cash is spent, we can assume that the ﬁrm will ﬁnance the intermediate investment by either
borrowing for this purpose only at date 0 or date 1, but not with a combination of the two. The initial
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date 0 investment is always ﬁnanced by external borrowing at date 0. Finally, to simplify the exposition
we assume that θ and the probability distribution of I˜1 are such that
F (Iˆ1)Iˆ1 >
∫ Iˆ1
0
ι(1 + θ)f(ι)dι, ∀Iˆ1 > 0 (3)
Iˆ1 is the largest intermediate investment that the ﬁrm undertakes. This assumption essentially requires
that θ cannot be too large, and it puts some restrictions on the probability distribution of I˜1. Intuitively,
inequality (3) implies that there is some minimum variation in the distribution of the required date-1
investment outlays.
The bank lenders' proﬁtability constraint at date 0 for ﬁnancing both investments by lending at this
date is
pk(R0 + F (Iˆ01 )R
1) ≥ I0 +
∫ Iˆ01
0
ι(1 + θ)f(ι)dι (4)
The left-hand side of this inequality is the expected pledgeable income from the date-0 and date-1 invest-
ments. The right-hand side is the expected investment cost. Iˆ01 is the amount that the bank decides to
lend to the ﬁrm at date 0 for investment at date 1. This is therefore the largest amount that the ﬁrm can
invest at date 1 when it uses date-0 ﬁnancing.5
The corresponding constraint at date 1 for ﬁnancing the intermediate investment at this date is
pk(R0 +R1) ≥ I0 + I1 (5)
The diﬀerence between (4) and (5) is that the realised value of the date-1 investment is known at date 1,
5The assumption I01 <
pR1
1+θ
ensures that we do not need to consider any overinvestment problem. If we were to let I1 >
pR1
1+θ
,
there could potentially be a risk shifting problem that could lead ﬁrms to invest too much. However, assuming that the bank
loan market is competitive and banks earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium, banks would never lend an amount larger than pR
1
1+θ
at date 0 for date 1-investment, since this reduces the social surplus. Zero proﬁts for banks imply that ﬁrms earn the entire
social surplus, and they will thus prefer a loan contract where they borrow at most pR
1
1+θ
.
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while with date-0 ﬁnancing the lenders must write a contract that is proﬁtable to them in expectation.
Notice the notation here: I1 refers to the realised investment requirement at date 1. Iˆ
0
1 is the amount
borrowed at date 0, and therefore the maximum investment possible at date 1 under date-0 ﬁnancing. The
actual realised investment size may be lower. Notice that excess borrowing capacity from the date-0 project
increases the ﬁrm's ability to ﬁnance date-1 projects. Finally, we assume that the bank credit market is
competitive. Banks oﬀer an interest rate that gives them zero proﬁt in expectation, and the expected social
surplus accrues to the borrower.
Whenever both options of ﬁnance are available, the ﬁrm will prefer date-1 ﬁnancing to reduce the
deadweight costs of using cash. Still, there may be states of the world when investment is possible under
date-0 ﬁnancing but not under date-1 ﬁnancing. The ﬁrm will prefer date-0 ﬁnancing if the beneﬁts of
being able to invest in these states of the world outweigh the costs of using cash to invest. We now want
to establish conditions when this is the case. The following theorem summarises the implications for ﬁrm
ﬁnancing:
Theorem 1. Under the conditions described above, there exist two intervals for k with diﬀerent implications
for ﬁrm ﬁnancing:
k ≤ k Firm ﬁnances date 1 investment at date 0
k ≤ k ≤ 1 Firm ﬁnances date 1 investment at date 1.
The proof is in Appendix A. More constrained ﬁrms, with values of k in the interval [k, k), prefer to take
on some cost in order to increase their ﬁnancial capacity in future states of the world when they face lower
income or investment cost overruns. This may take the form of holding cash, setting up a line of credit at
their bank, or even developing a strong banking relationship with their main bank. Notice that the results
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still stand if we let I0 = R
0 = 0 6 That is, the results are not driven by "cross-subsidisation" from the
date-0 investment project to the date-1 investment project, but by using low I1 states to "cross-subsidise"
high I1 states.
Suppose that a uniform shock to k happens at date 1, where the agents' ex ante belief of the probability
of this shock happening is equal to zero. An exogenous negative shock to credit availability, caused by
funding problems for the banks, may be interpreted as a uniformly negative change in the value of k in our
model. The only ﬁrms that will be aﬀected by this are those with k ≥ k. Firms with k < k will already
have raised suﬃcient ﬁnance to implement their projects at the intermediate date, and therefore do not
depend on external funding at this time. The model therefore predicts that an unexpected shock to credit
availability will have the most severe eﬀects on the investment of the initially least constrained ﬁrms. In
this model, the ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms will be the marginal borrowers at date 1. Hence, the model
provides the following empirical prediction:
Empirical prediction: Only ﬁrms that are ex ante ﬁnancially unconstrained, i.e. ﬁrms for which k ≥ k,
will have to reduce investment due to reduced credit availability following an external shock such as
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9.
2.2 Discussion
Investment opportunities are likely to deteriorate when an economic crisis occurs at date 1. In our
model, this has several eﬀects. First, a fall in the value of R1 (i.e. the conditional return on the intermediate
investment) may lead to a lower ﬁrst-best investment size Iˆ∗1 . For ﬁrms that already borrowed at date 0, this
may lead to ineﬃcient overinvestment if they have enough surplus cash to ﬁnance an investment I1 > Iˆ
∗
1 .
Such ﬁrms may still prefer to undertake the investment, since the bank lender will bear all the cost in the
6Deﬁne k = 0 in this case.
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unsuccessful state of the world, i.e. there is an opportunity for risk shifting. So the fact that less constrained
ﬁrms' investments are reduced more by reductions in credit availability is not necessarily a bad thing from
a social welfare point of view.7
If the value of investment opportunities declines such that p is reduced, rather than R1, this has a balance
sheet eﬀect in addition to the eﬀect of reduced real investment opportunities. That is because the expected
payoﬀ from the initial investment, pR0, is now lower than before, which may create a debt overhang problem
at date 1, assuming that creditors at date 0 are senior to new creditors at date 1. Thus, not only will ﬁrms
invest less because pR1 is lower, which is socially eﬃcient, they will also reduce investment in a socially
ineﬃcient way because a lower value of pR0 may reduce the ﬁrm's ability to obtain external ﬁnance at
date 1 beyond the reduction decreed by the reduction in pR1.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Introduction to the Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Norway is a well-developed, open economy with the world's third-highest GDP per capita of USD 79,090
(2009), whilst the overall economy is the 23rd largest in the world. Norway ranks highest in the World
on the human development index and is 13th in terms of global competitiveness for 2010.8 The economy
is internationally integrated and dominated by natural resources, in particular related to oil and natural
gas. Norway is a well-documented society, as illustrated by the availability of population data for research
purposes. Norway is a member state of the OECD and the European Economic Area.
7This possibility of an ineﬃcient intermediate investment may be seen as an additional intuitive motivation for the cost of
early ﬁnancing.
8Source: eco (2012).
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3.2 The Financial Crisis Survey
3.2.1 Survey Sample Selection Methodology
The ﬁnancial crisis survey was conducted by the Department of Strategy and Management at the Nor-
wegian School of Economics (NHH) as part of NHH's "Crisis, Restructuring, and Growth Project"9. The
general managers of 5,000 representative Norwegian ﬁrms received a letter including access codes to a web-
based10 questionnaire during the autumn of 2010, asking them about how their ﬁrm was inﬂuenced by and
responded to the ﬁnancial crisis. The invitation letter was signed by well-known professors from NHH,
including one former government minister. The execution of the survey was handled by Synovate Norway
AS11, a leading market research company. The questionnaire took the manager 20-25 minutes to ﬁll in,
and included 39 questions covering the position of the ﬁrm and its market before the crisis, how the crisis
aﬀected the ﬁrm and the market, the ﬁrm's responses, and current outlook. Some of these questions were
related to ﬁrm ﬁnancing and investments, and these are the questions that we study in this paper. The
pre-crisis period was deﬁned as from mid-2006 until mid-2008, and the respondents were asked to report
when the crisis started and ended with respect to their own ﬁrm.
The selected ﬁrms were randomly drawn from register data of all Norwegian ﬁrms that satisﬁed the
selection criteria. The ability to choose randomly from the population of all ﬁrms reduces selection bias rel-
ative to most survey papers. Responses were received from 1,248 ﬁrms (a 25% response rate). The selection
criteria are revenues greater than NOK 10 million and personnel expenses greater than NOK 3 million in the
year 2008.12 Only limited liability ﬁrms that ﬁled ﬁnancial accounts for the year 2008 are included. Firms
in the following industries are excluded: agriculture, forestry, electricity generation, water management, ﬁ-
9We are grateful to Lasse Lien and Eirik S. Knudsen at NHH for making these data available to us.
10The respondents also had the opportunity to answer by using a paper form.
11www.ipsos-mmi.no
12Based on the average USD/NOK exchange rate for 2008 of 5.64 this corresponds to $1.77 milion and $0.53 million
respectively.
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nancial services, insurance, the government sector, education, health care, waste management, political and
religious groups, cultural services, and international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Firms
with missing industry classiﬁcation were also excluded. The motivation behind these criteria is to select
operationally active and commercially driven companies whilst also including a representative share of small
and medium-sized companies in the economy. The exclusions based on industry classiﬁcation avoid pure
ﬁnancial holding companies, regulated ﬁrms, sectors with signiﬁcant government involvement like farming
and health care, as well as public services organised as limited companies. Including such ﬁrms would have
distorted the observed operational performance in the sample.
Table 2 compares ﬁrm characteristics of the ﬁrms included in the survey with the population of all
Norwegian ﬁrms that satisfy the survey selection criteria.13 The summary statistics suggest that the
population and survey sample ﬁrms are similar in most respects, as measured by mean values of the
variables. The survey sample ﬁrms are on average slightly larger and more proﬁtable, and are more likely
to pay a dividend. When it comes to these characteristics during the crisis, the diﬀerences seem slightly
larger. This is partly because the survey sample did not include ﬁrms that suﬀered bankruptcy, or otherwise
disappeared during the ﬁnancial crisis. The survey sample selection procedure thus created an inherent
survivorship bias, illustrated by the fraction of the ﬁrms which went bankrupt. Of all Norwegian ﬁrms in
existence in 2007 that satisﬁed our sample criteria, 1.6 percent went bankrupt during 2008-2010, while our
survey sample contains no bankrupt ﬁrms. These characteristics are comparable to the survey sample in
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010), whose respondents are generally slightly better-performing than
the average ﬁrm.14 The sample selection method will thus have a bias against ﬁnding ﬁrms experiencing
distress during the crisis, and it will most likely lead to the estimated adverse eﬀects of the crisis being too
small.
13The variables used are described in Table 1.
14It is unlikely that many managers of failed ﬁrms would allocate time to respond to such surveys, even if asked.
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The survey questions were collected solely for research purposes, and the participants were explicitly
promised that their individual responses would be treated conﬁdentially. Norwegian Social Science Data
Services15 were involved to oversee the handling of sensitive information. The credibility of the sponsoring
institution (NHH) as well as the overall execution of the survey make us believe that neither the decision
whether to respond or not, nor the speciﬁc answers to survey questions were biased in any particular
direction.
3.2.2 Answers to Survey Questions
Survey questions about how ﬁrms were aﬀected by the crisis were answered on an integer scale from -3 to
3. Negative numbers indicate a reduction in the respective variable due to the crisis, while positive numbers
indicate an increase. The respondents applied the scales subjectively in that no precise, quantitative
characterisations were given for each step. In addition, there was a 'not relevant' category. The frequencies
of each alternative answer to selected questions are shown in Table 3.
Around two thirds of the ﬁrms reply that they did not experience signiﬁcant changes in their access to
credit. However, we may note that the sample includes many ﬁrms that did not borrow either before or
during the crisis, and whose unchanged credit availability might stem mainly from the fact that they did
not require debt ﬁnancing and thus did not approach a bank during this period. These ﬁrms are unlikely to
exhibit a correlation between credit availability and investment behaviour. Their presence in the analysis
may thus bias our coeﬃcient estimates towards zero, reducing the likelihood of identifying any eﬀects. We
still include non-borrowing ﬁrms in our analysis, since dropping them would lose some non-borrowing ﬁrms
that wanted credit but did not get it, and therefore have no bank loans in the accounts.16 Including all
ﬁrms strengthens our analysis compared to studies that build primarily on data showing actual borrowing
15www.nsd.uib.no
16We run our analysis on a subsample of only those ﬁrms which at some point since 2002 have had bankloans and our results
remain. See Section 5.
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by ﬁrms.
Most of the ﬁrms experienced a negative eﬀect of the ﬁnancial crisis on the demand for their products
and services. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 suggest that the crisis in Norway was a crisis of demand.
The ﬁnancial crisis originated abroad, and was transmitted to Norwegian ﬁrms through reduced demand
for products and services, in addition to ﬁnancial channels such as the interbank market. Of the survey
ﬁrms, 68 percent experienced reduced demand following the crisis, while 45 percent of the ﬁrms experienced
reduced prices for their output.
The negative eﬀects on investments were strong, as shown for investments into plant, machinery and
equipment, and separately into buildings in Figure 5.
3.3 Financial and Bank Account Databases
We use a dataset with detailed information of the end-of-year balance separately on all bank deposit
and bank loan accounts, and interest accrued to the account during the year, for all Norwegian ﬁrms for
the years 1997-2009. The dataset includes a unique ﬁrm identiﬁer, which enables linking the observations
with other datasets like, e.g., the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial accounts. All data are in nominal terms.
The bank account data are collected annually by The Norwegian Tax Administration from the banks
for tax purposes. We are not aware of any incentives for the banks not to report truthfully. In addition,
banks are heavily regulated and closely supervised as in most developed countries. The banks' auditors
are also required to verify each annual reporting of these data to the tax administration. Taken together,
this suggests that the accuracy of the data is good. The banks are required to report electronically for
each account the following information: the account number; the name of the account holder(ﬁrm) and its
unique organisation (ID) number; the deposit or loan balance as of 31 December; and interest accrued during
the year. The interest accrued on loans includes, in addition to regular interest, any fees or commissions
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related to a loan. In addition, the reporting bank is identiﬁed with its name and organisation number. The
database is conﬁdential, but has been made available to us by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance17 under
strict conﬁdentiality conditions regarding data handling, access, and the non-disclosure of the identities of
the contracting parties. The database includes all bank accounts held by Norwegian ﬁrms at a domestically
operating bank, including Norwegian branches of foreign banks.
The observations in the bank account database are linked to a ﬁnancial accounts database, which contains
annual accounting data for all Norwegian private and public limited liability companies for the period 1993-
2009. Norwegian ﬁrms are required to have an authorised auditor18 and must ﬁle their annual ﬁnancial
accounts with the Register of Company Accounts19 by the end of July in the year following the accounting
year. The accounting year is required to follow the calender year. The accounting database includes the
complete proﬁt and loss account, the balance sheet, selected items from the notes to the accounts, and
other company related information such as, e.g. ﬁve-digit industry codes and legal form. The database is
further described in Mjøs (2007) and Mjøs and Øksnes (2012).
We compute a bankruptcy prediction variable based on information about all Norwegian corporate
bankruptcies obtained from the Norwegian Register of Bankruptcies.20 Accounting variables are normalised
by the ﬁrm's total assets. For the crisis variables, the normalisation is made by total assets at the end of
2007. To avoid our results being driven by outliers that have no economic meaning, we winsorise variables
that are ratios of total assets, revenues or bank debt at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
17Approvals gratefully received by letters dated 12 November 2008, 27 August 2009, and 26 March 2010.
18This requirement has been lifted for the smallest ﬁrms from 2011. Since this was decided after our sample period, this
lifting is unlikely to have an impact on our results.
19More information is provided at www.brreg.no.
20We use a logit model to estimate bankruptcy probabilities, using the same explanatory variables that have been used in
Norges Bank's Sebra Bankruptcy Prediction Model (Eklund et al., 2001).
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3.4 Timeline
Figure 4 illustrates the timing of the variables we use in the analysis. The survey was conducted in the
autumn of 2010. The pre-crisis variables are set to the year 2007, or on 31 December 2007. These include
most variables to describe ﬁrm and bank characteristics. We deﬁne the crisis to last for the years 2008 and
2009, with 31 December 2009 as the end of the crisis period. Since our data is of annual frequency, this
timing is likely to give the best reﬂection of the real events as they occurred. For accounting and bank
account variables that reﬂect performance and behaviour during the ﬁnancial crisis, we use annualised
changes in balance sheet variables from 31 December 2007 to 31 December 2009, or average values from
the income statements of the ﬁrm in 2008 and 2009. Of the ﬁrms reporting in the survey that they have
been aﬀected by the crisis, 87 percent were ﬁrst aﬀected prior to year-end 2009. The remaining 13 percent
were not aﬀected until 2010. It is also unclear whether most ﬁrms which were aﬀected by the crisis during
late 2008 to early 2009 were still aﬀected during 2010. We therefore keep end-of-year 2009 as the end of the
ﬁnancial crisis. The Norwegian economy had also returned to positive GDP growth well before this date,
as is shown in Figure 1.
3.5 Empirical Methodology
The answers to the survey questions contain seven or eight possible alternatives, but since we do not
know the respondents' subjective interpretation of the scale, we choose to apply a binary dependent variable,
e.g., if the ﬁrm experienced reduced credit quality and responded -3, -2, or -1, we apply the number "1" to
the observation or otherwise "0". We model the equation as a logit model.
The observations are aggregated at the ﬁrm level. Most Norwegian ﬁrms have only one bank relationship.
For our sample, 58 percent of the ﬁrms have bank accounts (deposit and/or loan) at only one single bank,
while 86 percent have bank accounts at no more than two banks.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 shows additional information about the distribution of variables in the survey sample. The
median ﬁrm had NOK 14 million in total assets and NOK 32 million in revenues in 2007.21 The median
age of the ﬁrm is 14 years. The ﬁrms are thus relatively small, yet representative for commercial limited
liability ﬁrms in Norway. The indicator variable for bank loans shows that about 54 percent of the ﬁrms
borrow from a bank. The table also shows that proﬁtability was reduced during the crisis. While the
median annual return on assets (ROA) prior to the crisis was 17.6 percent, median ROA during the crisis
was only 12.1 percent. On average, ﬁrms increased their borrowing from banks by 0.5 percent of 2007
assets, while they increased their cash holdings by 1.4 percent of 2007 assets during the crisis. Table 4
shows that while 52.9 percent of the survey sample ﬁrms paid ordinary dividends for the accounting year
2007, the corresponding annual average for the years 2008-9 was only 36.4 percent.
4.2 The Eﬀect of Credit Availability on Investment
The extent to which ﬁnancial conditions impact on real economic decisions is the main motivation for
analysing the ﬁrms' access to credit. Since ﬁrms borrow to ﬁnance investments in ﬁxed assets, we are
interested in the eﬀects that changes in credit supply can have on such investment. In our setting, we study
how changes in credit supply aﬀected the ﬁrms' real investments using the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9 as an
exogenous event. We employ our survey data, where ﬁrms answered questions about the extent to which
they changed real investments as a result of the crisis. We use these investment variables as the left-hand
side variables, and see if they were aﬀected by changes in credit supply. The objective is to answer our ﬁrst
21Based on the average USD/NOK exchange rate in 2007 of 5.86, this is equivalent to $2.4 million and $5.5 million respec-
tively.
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research question: Do changes in credit availability aﬀect ﬁrms' investment?
A major advantage of our survey data is that ﬁrm managers have responded whether their investments
were negatively aﬀected by the crisis. When answering these questions, the manager implicitly takes those
investment opportunities that the ﬁrm had at the time into account. While accounting data contain the
actual amounts invested, they do not show how large this amount is relative to the ﬁrm's needs or available
projects. Earlier literature has struggled to ﬁnd satisfactory proxy variables for investment opportunities.
Using actual investments is a poor alternative for this purpose. A ﬁrm with a high level of investment may
still invest below its ﬁrst-best level, while a ﬁrm with a lower investment level does not, so long as the high
investment ﬁrm has more investment opportunities. A common approach has been to use the market-to-
book ratio, or Tobin's Q, as a proxy for investment opportunities in investment regressions. This approach
has been critisised by, among others, Erickson and Whited (2000), who argue that mismeasurement of
Tobin's Q leads to biased estimates. Since our sample primarily consists of private ﬁrms, we do not
have information about Tobin's Q for our sample. The fact that the survey questions reﬂect investment
opportunities is thus particularly useful for our sample of small and medium-sized ﬁrms. However, changes
in the demand for the ﬁrms' goods and services can also cause changes in investments during the crisis. We
must therefore use the questions about changes in demand faced by the ﬁrm as control variables to identify
a causal eﬀect of changes in credit supply on investment.
Table 5 shows the results of logit regressions depicting the eﬀect of credit supply and output demand
on ﬁrm investments during the crisis. For discrete variables, the reported coeﬃcient is the eﬀect on the
likelihood that investment is reduced by changing the explanatory variable from zero to one. For continuous
variables, the table shows marginal eﬀects. The dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to one
if the ﬁrm reduced investments due to the crisis, i.e. the survey question related to investment is answered
by -3, -2 or -1. Answers to survey questions about credit supply and the demand faced by the ﬁrm are used
to construct the right-hand variables. The credit supply variable is equal to one if the ﬁrm reports reduced
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credit supply, and otherwise zero, while the ﬁrm demand variables are equal to one in case of negative
development, otherwise zero. We estimate the following equation:
investment reduced = f(β0credit supply reduced
+ β1output demand reduced + β2output prices reduced + β3export demand reduced
+ β4∆ cash ﬂow)
Columns (1) and (4) in Table 5 show estimates of β0 when we exclude the other control variables.
The other columns include variables reﬂecting the demand for the ﬁrm's products and services taken from
the survey, and change in cash ﬂow during the crisis from the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial accounts. The ﬁrm demand
variables are survey question answers about how the ﬁrm's demand, prices and export demand were aﬀected
by the crisis. These variables control for changes in the ﬁrms' creditworthiness, as well as the direct impact
that changes in the ﬁrm's markets have on their investments. We use this speciﬁcation to distinguish
between changes in credit availability that stem from changes in the ﬁrm's prospects and ability to repay
its debts, and changes in credit availability that occurs outside the ﬁrm and originate on the supply side of
the credit market.
In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is based on the answer to the survey question about how the
ﬁrm's investment in plant, machinery and equipment was aﬀected by the crisis. Columns (2)-(3) include
variables that control for the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm. Credit availability is positively correlated with
this type of investment, both with and without controlling for ﬁrm creditworthiness. That is, a reduction
in credit availability reduces investment. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is smaller when we include the
control variables, which is as expected since part of the change in credit availability stems from reduced
creditworthiness. Using the coeﬃcients in column (3), lower credit availability increases the probability
that investments are reduced by the crisis by 11.9 percentage points. This compares to a share of the
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sample reporting a lower investment of 32.8 percent. Reduced credit supply thus increases this likelihood
by around one third. In addition, we include in columns (2)-(3) the average change in cash ﬂow during the
crisis compared to the 2007 cash ﬂow. As expected, the results show that ﬁrms that experienced positive
changes in cash ﬂow during the crisis had a more favourable development in their investments.
Looking at investment in buildings in columns (4)-(6), we see that the coeﬃcient on credit availability
is still signiﬁcant when we control for the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm, although the eﬀect is somewhat
weaker in column (6) compared to the investments in plant, machinery and equipment equation in column
(3). This could be related to fewer ﬁrms having indicated changes in investments in buildings during the
crisis, suggesting that such investments may be relevant for a smaller number of ﬁrms. The ﬁrms for which
such investments are not relevant may thus bias this coeﬃcient towards zero to a larger extent than for the
plant, machinery and equipment equation.
Taken together, Table 5 suggests that reductions in credit availability during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9
caused the ﬁrms' investments to fall. However, adverse developments in the markets for the ﬁrms' goods
and services seemed to play a larger role than changes in credit supply in explaining reductions in ﬁrm
investment in Norway.
4.3 Eﬀects of ex ante Financial Constraints on the Impact of Credit Availability on
Investments
In this section we address our second research question by investigating how the relationship between
changes in credit availability and investment is related to the extent to which a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained
prior to the crisis. The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9 came unexpectedly, and even some of the most
creditworthy ﬁrms were aﬀected. In this situation, it is possible that becoming rationed in their access to
credit may have had more severe consequences for ﬁrms which were initially unconstrained. That is, it is
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not clear from the theory literature which group of ﬁrms, i.e. at which level of ﬁnancial constraints, would
be the ones most aﬀected by a ﬁnancial crisis. The theory model presented in Section 2 predicts that the ex
ante least constrained ﬁrms will be the most negatively aﬀected by a sudden adverse credit supply shock.
Since ﬁrms borrow to fund investments, being aﬀected here means that changes in credit availability aﬀect
the ﬁrms' real investments.
The literature has yet to settle on a standard measure of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints. In our study we
apply four broadly accepted measures that reﬂect the level of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints before the crisis.
This approach makes the analysis less vulnerable to the choice of measure. The measures are ﬁrm size, the
Whited and Wu (2006) index, an indicator of dividend payment, and the ﬁxed asset to total assets ratio. All
four measures are based on the ﬁrms' accounting information prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, i.e. information
for the accounting year 2007, in order to best correspond to the empirical predictions in Section 2. We then
sort the sample into groups based on each of these measures, and perform the analysis separately within
each group.
Note that by using standard measures of ﬁnancial constraints we do not assess to what degree certain
ﬁrms actually hedge, nor the impact of hedging on ﬁnancial constraints. The actual hedging mechanism
may vary across ﬁrms and over time, and is inherently diﬃcult to measure. Our approach is more indirect,
where we ﬁrst present our hedging-based model with its empirical implications, which we then proceed to
test.
The ﬁrst measure, ﬁrm size, is given by the ﬁrm's total assets at the end of 2007. Large ﬁrms have
more alternatives in obtaining external ﬁnance. For example, they have better opportunities of raising
funds through the equity or bond markets, while smaller ﬁrms are usually restricted to bank borrowing.
A standard assumption in the literature is therefore often that ﬁrm size is a good proxy for the extent to
which a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained, with smaller ﬁrms being more constrained. The second measure we
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use is the Whited and Wu (2006) index. This index is given by
−0.091
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CF− 0.062DIV + 0.021LTD− 0.044ASSETS + 0.102
4
ISG− 0.035
4
SG
where CF is cashﬂow, DIV is a dividend payment dummy, LTD is long-term debt, ASSETS is the logarithm
of total assets, ISG is the industry sales growth, and SG denotes the ﬁrm's sales growth. A higher value
of the index indicates a more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm. The index was created using quarterly data for
publicly listed U.S. ﬁrms, which implies that we divide the ﬂow coeﬃcients by 4 to ﬁt our annual data. This
index and the economic model underlying it are presented in Appendix B. We use the parameter estimates
from the original paper (Whited and Wu, 2006). Notice that the negative parameter value on ASSETS is
consistent with the presumption that smaller ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially constrained.
The third measure is based on whether the ﬁrm paid a dividend for the accounting year 2007. While a
ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm may or may not pay a dividend, it will usually not be optimal for a ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm to pay a dividend. These ﬁrms have a marginal value of keeping an extra dollar within the
ﬁrm that is greater than one, and therefore prefer to use available funds to ﬁnance internal projects rather
than pay out as dividend. Dividing ﬁrms by the extent to which they pay dividends has therefore been
a standard approach in the literature since being introduced in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)'s
seminal paper on the cash ﬂow sensitivity of investment.
The fourth measure is the ﬁxed assets to total assets ratio. This ratio gives an indication of the inherent
information asymmetries in the ﬁrms. Firms with high ﬁxed assets to total assets ratios may be less
ﬁnancially constrained than ﬁrms with lower ratios. These assets are less exposed to information asymmetry
problems, and are also more pledgeable to creditors as they are more diﬃcult for the ﬁrm's management
to divert. Fixed assets are therefore more likely to be suitable as collateral than more opaque assets like
inventories and accounts receivables.
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For size, the Whited and Wu (2006) index and the ﬁxed asset to total asset ratio, we sort ﬁrms into
four quartiles, while for dividend payers there are only two groups, based on whether or not the ﬁrm paid
a dividend for the accounting year 2007.
The extent to which these categorisations are overlapping is illustrated in Table 6. The table shows the
number of ﬁrms that fall into the least constrained group of ﬁrms for two ﬁnancial constraints measures,
given on the horizontal and the vertical axis respectively. For example, the number of ﬁrms that fall into
the least constrained group on both the size and the Whited and Wu (2006) measure, i.e. group 4 for
size and group 1 for Whited and Wu (2006), is 210. This compares to a total of 296 ﬁrms being in the
least constrained size group. In other words, of the least constrained ﬁrms by the size measure, around 70
percent are also in the least constrained group by the Whited and Wu (2006) measure. This is perhaps
not surprising given that the Whited and Wu (2006) measures depend on ﬁrm size. The ﬁxed asset ratio
measure is less correlated with the size measure. The fact that there is heterogeneity in the categorisation
between measures suggests that we are able to capture several dimensions of ﬁrm ﬁnancial constraints, and
that the four measures are not merely picking up a common underlying ﬁrm characteristic.
Panel A of Table 7 shows summary statistics for the four groups sorted on ﬁrm size. Group 1 contains
the smallest ﬁrms, while group 4 contains the largest ﬁrms. We see that the level of pre-crisis cash to
asset ratio is substantially lower for the large ﬁrms. However, the relationship between cash holdings and
ﬁnancial constraints is not straightforward. Proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to be ﬁnancially unconstrained, as well as
cash rich due to their large proﬁts. Unproﬁtable ﬁrms, on the other hand, may also strive to be cash rich
to reduce their costs of being ﬁnancially constrained. How to interpret diﬀerences in cash holdings between
groups of ﬁrms with varying levels of ﬁnancial constraints is therefore not clear. The largest ﬁrms seem to
have been harder hit during the crisis, both on the demand variables and in their credit availability. The
investments into plant, machinery and equipment, and buildings, were more heavily reduced among large
ﬁrms. There is no systematic diﬀerence in bank borrowing between large and small ﬁrms prior to the crisis.
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The descriptive statistics are similar when we sort on the Whited and Wu (2006) index in Panel B of
Table 7. In this panel, group 4 denotes the group with the most ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms in 2007, while
group 1 is the group with the least ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms prior to the ﬁnancial crisis. We observe that
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have a higher bankloan to total assets ratio than the less ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms. The relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and cash balances is less clear, as the intermediate
groups 2 and 3 have higher average cash balances than groups 1 and 4. Still, the most ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms have a higher cash to total assets ratio of 16.5 percent compared to 12.5 percent for less constrained
ﬁrms.
Panel C of Table 7 shows ﬁrms grouped by whether or not they paid ordinary dividends for the accounting
year 2007. We see that dividend-paying ﬁrms have more cash than non-dividend payers. This illustrates
the already mentioned endogeneity of cash holdings, since a ﬁrm will typically hold cash prior to a dividend
payment. At the same time, since non-dividend payers are more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained, they
want to hold cash to hedge against future cash ﬂow shortfalls. In the data, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the
second.
Panel D of Table 7 shows ﬁrms grouped by the ﬁxed assets to total assets ratio. Firms with lower ﬁxed
assets to total assets ratios are more proﬁtable, hold more cash and are less likely to borrow from banks.
This tendency also applies throughout the crisis. Across panels A-D, the mean crisis survey responses do
not show clear systematic diﬀerences across the levels of ﬁnancing constraints. This makes it less likely
that any diﬀerences we ﬁnd between groups are driven by a diﬀerent interpretation of the survey scales.
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Table 8 shows logit regressions for the following equations
investment in PME reduced = f(β0credit supply reduced
+ β1output demand reduced + β2output prices reduced + β3export demand reduced
+ β4∆ cash ﬂow)
investment in buildings reduced = f(β0credit supply reduced
+ β1output demand reduced + β2output prices reduced + β3export demand reduced
+ β4∆ cash ﬂow)
PME is short for "plant, machinery and equipment". The independent variables are the same as in the pre-
vious speciﬁcation, but we only report the coeﬃcient estimates for the credit availability variable. Panel A
shows the results when we sort the ﬁrms by size. In line with the predictions of the theory model in Sec-
tion 2, the only signiﬁcant eﬀect of credit availability on investment in the PME equation is found for the
group of large ﬁrms. For the smaller ﬁrms, output demand (not reported) is more important than credit
availability in determining investments. This pattern is similar for investments in buildings.
Panel B shows the eﬀects of changes in credit availability on investment, based on the survey responses,
when we sort on the Whited and Wu (2006) index. The results are similar to the ﬁndings when we sort
on ﬁrm size. In the PME-equation, only group 1, which constitutes the least ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms,
exhibits a signiﬁcant positive relationship between credit availability and investment in plant, machinery
and equipment. For investments in buildings we get similar results.
Our results are conﬁrmed when we group ﬁrms by whether they made a provision for dividend to
shareholders in the 2007 ﬁnancial statements, as is shown in Panel C. The eﬀects of credit availability are
largest for the dividend-paying ﬁrms, which is consistent with the results in Panels A and B. Again, this
suggests that the investments of the least constrained ﬁrms were the ones most aﬀected by a change in
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credit availability. This is consistent with our theory model in Section 2. Panel D, which is grouped by the
ﬁxed assets to total assets ratio, conﬁrms the trend of the other panels. Firms with more collateralisable
assets are more likely to experience a reduction in investment due to declining credit supply.
Overall, these results suggest that a correlation between credit availability and investments of ex ante
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms during economic downturns should not automatically be taken as evidence of a
credit channel mechanism. As we show in this paper, the dynamics of ﬁnancial constraints are more complex,
as ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms seek to hedge against future cash ﬂow shortfalls, and potentially also against
future declines in credit availability, by holding more cash or even by reducing current investments to
increase their capacity to invest in the future. The results in this paper indicate that further empirical
research on microeconomic data is needed to understand the exact workings of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
frictions on business cycles.
5 Robustness
We do several robustness analyses. First, since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9 originated outside Norway,
and Norwegian ﬁrms were aﬀected through reduced export demand, we include the ﬁrm's export share of
revenues as an additional control variable. The survey included a question of what fraction of the ﬁrm's
revenues came from exports. Since other countries were more aﬀected by the crisis than Norway, it is likely
that export-oriented ﬁrms suﬀered larger declines in the demand for their products and services. Including
this variable should therefore enable us to better control for changes in ﬁrm creditworthiness. The results
are not materially aﬀected.
We also run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, as well as ordered logit regressions. The main
diﬀerence between doing ordered logit regressions and OLS is that OLS assumes that a one unit move
in the survey answer categories has a uniform interpretation along the scale. That is, a move from the
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category -3 to -2 is of a similar magnitude as moving from, say, category 0 to category 1. With ordered
logit regressions, the magnitude of each category move is a separate parameter to be estimated. The OLS
and ordered logit regressions give results which are largely consistent with the logit regression results.
We get similar results when we run the regressions with observations at the ﬁrm-bank level (i.e. the
individual banking-relationship level) rather than the ﬁrm level, and the statistical signiﬁcance is increased
even when we cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm-bank level. Running the regressions at the ﬁrm-bank level
enables us to include bank characteristics as control variables. Including bank size, measured by national
corporate loan market share, bank nationality, and loan loss provisions do not alter our main ﬁndings.
We run several other robustness tests. First, we leave out all ﬁrms without bank loans ex ante, to see
if non-borrowers drive the results. In one speciﬁcation, we keep only the ﬁrms that borrow from a bank
in at least one of the years 2005-7, while in another we drop all ﬁrms that do not borrow from a bank
in 2007. Our ﬁndings remain. We then leave out ﬁrms that answer not relevant to some of the survey
questions, without signiﬁcant eﬀects on our results. Third, we leave out ﬁrms in services industries. Many
of the other papers in the literature focus on manufacturing ﬁrms, and we therefore perform this test to
conﬁrm that our results are still valid on a more conventional industry sample. Finally, we drop ﬁrms with
ﬁnancing from other group companies on their balance sheet. Firms with access to group ﬁnance may have
a diﬀerent banking relationship than stand-alone entities. Our results still remain.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show how non-listed small and medium-sized ﬁrms are aﬀected by changes in credit
availability using the ﬁnancial crisis in Norway in 2008-9 as an exogenous event. We investigate whether
changes in credit availability aﬀect investment after controlling for the ﬁrm's output demand. We ﬁnd
that this is the case, even though the eﬀect of changes in credit availability is substantially reduced when
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including ﬁrm output demand control variables. In our second research question, we ﬁnd that changes
in credit availability aﬀect investments the most for the least ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. A potential
reason for this is that the unconstrained ﬁrms have the easiest access to credit before the crisis, and are
therefore likely to experience the largest changes in a situation where banks reduce access to credit for all
ﬁrms. We present a stylised theory model to illustrate the mechanism behind this. The ﬁndings suggest
that purely looking at the correlation between credit availability and investments of the most ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms during economic downturns is unlikely to capture the full dynamics of the credit channel
on the business cycle. Financially constrained ﬁrms' tendency to use cash holdings and other means to
hedge against future cash ﬂow shortfalls, and potentially also against future credit market disruptions,
means that the dynamics of ﬁnancial constraints and their eﬀects on real investments are more complex
than has generally been assumed in prior literature.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Iˆ01 =
pR1
1+θ implies that the ﬁrm always invests, and (4) will thus not constrain the ﬁrm. We begin
by showing that (4) is always binding when Iˆ01 <
pR1
1+θ . Since date-1 investment is always proﬁtable, the
social surplus will always be maximised for the largest value of Iˆ01 possible under (4). Denote the diﬀerence
between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (4) as G(Iˆ01 ), and diﬀerentiate this with respect to
Iˆ01 :
dG(Iˆ01 )
dIˆ01
= pkf(Iˆ01 )R
1 − Iˆ01 (1 + θ)f(Iˆ01 ) (6)
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The condition for (6) to be negative is:
pkR1 < Iˆ01 (1 + θ) (7)
(1) and (3) imply that whenever (4) is not satisﬁed, we have:
pkF (Iˆ01 )R
1 ≤ pkR0 − I0 + pkF (Iˆ01 )R1 <
∫ Iˆ01
0
ι(1 + θ)f(ι)dι < F (Iˆ01 )Iˆ
0
1 (1 + θ)
or, for F (Iˆ01 ) > 0:
pkR1 < Iˆ01 (1 + θ) (8)
This shows that G
(
Iˆ01
)
is always decreasing for values of Iˆ01 for which (4) is not satisﬁed. When it exists,
the value of Iˆ01 for which (4) is binding, i.e. the value where an inﬁnitesimal increase in Iˆ
0
1 violates (4),
must therefore be unique.
We let Iˆ11 be the value of I1 where (5) is binding or the supremum of its set of feasible values, i.e.
pR1
1+θ ,
whichever is lowest. Thus, Iˆ11 is the largest investment possible under date 1-ﬁnancing:
Iˆ11 ≡ min
(
pk(R0 +R1)− I0, pR
1
1 + θ
)
(9)
We next show that condition (4) is always satisﬁed whenever condition (5) is satisﬁed. By this we
mean that Iˆ01 ≥ Iˆ11 . We ﬁrst check that condition (4) is satisﬁed for Iˆ01 = Iˆ11 . Thus, we show that date-0
ﬁnancing is always possible whenever date-1 ﬁnancing is possible. We focus on the case when Iˆ11 <
pR1
1+θ , or
k < (1+θ)I0+pR
1
(1+θ)p(R0+R1)
, since the ﬁrm will always be able to ﬁnance the required investment for larger values of
k, and the ﬁrm prefers intermediate date-1 borrowing in this case to avoid the deadweight costs of using
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cash.
pk(R0 + F (Iˆ11 )R
1)− I0 ≥ F (Iˆ11 )
(
pk(R0 +R1)− I0
)
= F (Iˆ11 )Iˆ
1
1 >
∫ Iˆ11
0
ι(1 + θ)f(ι)dι (10)
The ﬁrst inequality is true because pkR0 ≥ I0. The equality follows from (9), and the latter inequality
follows from (3). Whenever the left-hand side of (5) is strictly larger than the right-hand side, the second
equality in (10) becomes an inequality, and the overall result still holds. We have thus shown that condition
(4) is always satisﬁed for all values of I1 for which (5) is satisﬁed. This means that Iˆ
1
1 ≤ Iˆ01 .
Intermediate borrowing is trivially strictly better than initial borrowing for k = 1. Our task now is to
show that there exists a region k ∈ [k, k) where initial borrowing is preferred to intermediate borrowing.
The lower value of this interval, k = I0
pR0
, is given by (1).
We need to show that k exists. First, we must show that there is a cut-oﬀ value below which only
condition (4) holds while condition (5) is not satisﬁed. For any k < (1+θ)I0+pR
1
(1+θ)p(R0+R1)
, there exists a value  > 0
by which we can increase date-1 investment from Iˆ11 (deﬁned by (9)):
Iˆ1 = pk(R
0 +R1)− I0 +  (11)
and use in (4) to obtain:
pk(R0 + F (Iˆ1)R
1)− I0 ≥ F (Iˆ1)
(
pk(R0 +R1)− I0
)
= F (Iˆ1)
(
Iˆ1 − 
)
>
∫ Iˆ1
0
ι(1 + θ)f(ι)dι (12)
The ﬁnal inequality follows from (3) being a strict inequality. This shows that there exist states of the world
in which ﬁnancing is possible under date-0 ﬁnancing but not under date-1 ﬁnancing. For any θ > 0, date-1
ﬁnancing is preferred for k ≥ (1+θ)I0+pR1
(1+θ)p(R0+R1)
, i.e. when all investment sizes can get ﬁnanced at date 1. This
is because date-1 ﬁnancing avoids the deadweight cost of using cash to invest. For θ = 0, date-0 ﬁnancing
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is always weakly preferred for any k ∈ (k, 1], because this increases the maximum investment size possible
relative to using date-1 ﬁnancing. Expressions (10) and (12) imply that date-0 ﬁnancing is strictly preferred
to date-1 ﬁnancing for k < (1+θ)I0+pR
1
(1+θ)p(R0+R1)
when θ = 0. Continuity ensures that there exists some θ > 0,
dependent on k < (1+θ)I0+pR
1
(1+θ)p(R0+R1)
, for which date-0 ﬁnancing is strictly preferred. We have thus established
that a value k may exist, as long as θ is suﬃciently small. The exact value of k depends on the value of
θ.
B Computing the Whited and Wu (2006) Index
In this section, we describe the economic model underlying the ﬁnancial constraints index provided by
Whited and Wu (2006). Their model is a structural economic model, where the ﬁrm maximises the expected
discounted value of future dividends, given by:
Vit = Eit (Σ
∞
τ=tβt,τdit) (13)
Vit is the value of ﬁrm i at time t. βt,τ is the discount factor for cash ﬂows at time τ discounted back to
time t. dit is the ﬁrm's dividend. These dividends are given by the identity:
dit = pi(Kit, νit)− ψ(Iit,Kit)− Iit +Bit+1 − (1 + rt)Bit (14)
pi(·) is the ﬁrm's proﬁt function. Kit is the beginning-of-period capital stock, while νit is a stochastic
variable. Iit are investments, Bit is borrowing, and rt is the interest rate on debt. The marginal proﬁt of
capital is assumed to be:
piK(Kit, νit) =
Yit − µCit
Kit
(15)
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where Yit denotes revenue, Cit are variable costs, while µ is a parameter. Capital is governed by the
intertemporal equation:
Kit+1 = Kit + (1− δit)Iit+1 (16)
where δit is the depreciation rate of capital. The adjustment cost function of capital is given by:
ψ(Kit, Iit) =
(
α0 +
1
2
α2
(
Iit
Kit
)2
+
1
3
α3
(
Iit
Kit
)3)
Kit (17)
The ﬁrm faces two ﬁnancial constraints:
dit ≥d∗it (18)
Bit ≤B∗it (19)
d∗it and B
∗
it could result from asymmetric information and agency costs, and are unobservable to the econo-
metrician.
The Euler equation for Kit is
Eit
(
βt,t+1
(
1 + λit+1
1 + λit
)
(piK(Kit+1, νit+1)− ψK(Iit+1,Kit+1) + (1− δit+1) (ψI(Iit+1,Kit+1)))
)
= ψI(Iit,Kit)+1
(20)
The Euler equation for Bit is
(1 + λit) = Eit ((1 + λit+1)(1 + rt)βt,t+1) + γit (21)
λit is the shadow cost of the capital constraint. This shadow cost is parameterised as follows:
λit = b0+b1TLTDit+b2DIV POSit+b3SGit+b4LNTAit+b5ISGit+b6CASHit+b7CFit+b8IDARit (22)
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TLTDit is total long term debt. DIV POSit is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm pays positive
dividends. SGit is the ﬁrm's annual sales growth. LNTAit is the logarithm of the ﬁrm's total assets. ISGit
is industry sales growth, based on 2-digit NACE industry categories. CASHit is the ﬁrm's cash balance.
CFit is the ﬁrm's cash ﬂow. IDARit is the industry debt to assets ratio. Since the ﬁrms in our sample are
mostly unlisted ﬁrms, we do not include the number of analysts following the ﬁrm in this equation.
C Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Quarterly log(GDP) of Mainland Norway 1978-2011. Source: Statistics Norway.
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Figure 2: Number of bankruptcies of limited liability companies 1999-2011. Financial and other specially
regulated ﬁrms, government entities and non-proﬁt organisations are excluded. Monthly and 12-monthly
moving averages. Source: Norwegian Register of Bankruptcies.
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Figure 3: Timing in the theory model.
Dates
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Date 0-ﬁnance
Date 1-ﬁnance
-
Invest I0
Borrow I0 + Iˆ
0
1
Invest I0
Borrow I0
Invest I1 if I1 ≤ Iˆ01
Repay Iˆ01 − I1 if I1 ≤ Iˆ01
Repay Iˆ01 if I1 > Iˆ
0
1
Invest I1 if I1 ≤ Iˆ11
Borrow I1 if I1 ≤ Iˆ11
Payoﬀ (R0 +R1) w/prob p if I1 ≤ Iˆ01
Payoﬀ R0 w/prob p if I1 > Iˆ
0
1
Payoﬀ 0 w/prob 1− p
Payoﬀ (R0 +R1) w/prob p if I1 ≤ Iˆ11
Payoﬀ R0 w/prob p if I1 > Iˆ
1
1
Payoﬀ 0 w/prob 1− p
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Figure 4: Timeline of data.
Dates
Pre-crisis variables
(register data)
Crisis variables
(survey and register data)
Survey questions were asked
31.12. 31.12. 31.12. 31.12.
2007 2008 2009 2010
-
Table 1: Description of Variables in Tables 2, 4 and 7.
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Log(assets), or assets Logarithm of ﬁrm total assets, or ﬁrm total assets
Log(revenues), or revenues Logarithm of ﬁrm revenues, or ﬁrm revenues
∆log(assets) Change in logarithm of ﬁrm total assets from 2006 to 2007
∆log(revenues) Change in logarithm of ﬁrm revenues from 2006 to 2007
Firmage Age of the ﬁrm in years
Proﬁtability (ROA) Earnings before ﬁnancial costs and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets
Loss indicator Indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has negative EBIT
Cashﬂow EBIT + depreciation divided by total assets
Fixed asset investment Fixed asset investment divided by total assets
Fixed assets_assets Fixed asset-to-total assets ratio
Bank loan indicator Indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a bank loan (>NOK100,000)
Bank loan_assets Bank loan divided by total assets
Bank cash_assets Bank deposit divided by total assets
Dividend indicator Indicator variable equal to one if ﬁrm paid ordinary dividend for the year
Bankruptcy probability Estimated bankruptcy probability, using a logit model and accounting variables
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) Change in log total assets from end of 2007 to end of 2009
∆log(revenues) Change in log revenues from 2007 to 2009
Proﬁtability (ROA) 2008-9 average of earnings before ﬁnancial costs and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets
Loss indicator Average loss indicator dummy 2008-9
Cash ﬂow Average EBIT + depreciation in 2008 and 2009 divided by total assets
∆Cash ﬂow Average cash ﬂow in 2008 and 2009 minus cash ﬂow in 2007, divided by total assets
Fixed asset investment Average ﬁxed asset investment in 2008-9 divided by total assets
∆Bank loan_assets Change in bank loan from 2007 to 2009 divided by 2007-assets
∆Bank cash_assets Change in bank cash from 2007 to 2009 divided by 2007-assets
Dividend indicator Average dividend indicator dummy for 2008 and 2009
Bankruptcy frequency Indicator equal to one if ﬁrm went bankrupt during 2008-2010
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Table 2: Survey Sample vs. All Firms. The table reports sample mean of the ﬁrm characteristics of all ﬁrms
that satisfy the sample selection criteria, and for the survey sample ﬁrms. Crisis performance variables are
averages for the years 2008-9. Most variables are normalised by ﬁrm assets. The variables are described
in Table 1.
All ﬁrms Survey sample ﬁrms
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Log(assets) 9.746 9.832
Log(revenues) 10.398 10.585
∆log(assets) 0.178 0.169
∆log(revenues) 0.197 0.201
Firmage 17.592 16.102
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.177 0.190
Loss indicator 0.123 0.070
Cashﬂow 0.181 0.194
Fixed asset investment 0.085 0.083
Fixed assets_assets 0.176 0.180
Bank loan indicator 0.514 0.538
Bank loan_assets 0.123 0.118
Bank cash_assets 0.192 0.184
Dividend indicator 0.467 0.529
Bankruptcy probability 0.010 0.008
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) 0.032 0.009
∆log(revenues) -0.028 -0.064
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.099 0.133
Loss indicator 0.185 0.159
Cash ﬂow 0.119 0.122
∆Cash ﬂow -0.070 -0.071
Fixed asset investment 0.055 0.050
∆Bank loan_assets 0.011 0.005
∆Bank cash_assets 0.019 0.014
Dividend indicator 0.345 0.364
Bankruptcy frequency 0.016 0.000
N 21,548 1,189
Table 3: Survey Question Answers: How was the ﬁrm aﬀected by the crisis? The table reports the
distribution of responses to selected survey questions about how ﬁrms were aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis
in 2008-9.
Q: How was your ﬁrm aﬀected by the crisis?
Credit availability Demand Prices
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
-3 Reduced 65 5.6% 210 17.9% 72 6.2%
-2 81 7.0% 278 23.8% 178 15.3%
-1 122 10.5% 303 25.9% 275 23.7%
0 631 54.3% 203 17.4% 451 38.8%
1 28 2.4% 42 3.6% 36 3.1%
2 19 1.6% 27 2.3% 43 3.7%
3 Increased 24 2.1% 33 6.3% 9 0.8%
Not relevant 191 16.5% 74 6.3% 97 8.4%
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Figure 5: Survey Question Answers: How did the ﬁrm change its investments due to the crisis? The
ﬁgure reports the distribution of responses to the survey questions about how ﬁrms changed investments
in plant, machinery and equipment, and buildings, respectively, due to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics. All sample ﬁrms. Crisis performance variables are averages for the years 2008-9.
Most variables are normalised by ﬁrm assets. The variables are described in Table 1.
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Assets 1,189 134,886 1,685,784 8,045 14,332 34,177
Revenues 1,189 106,500 420,277 17,575 32,471 70,663
∆log(assets) 1,156 0.169 0.329 0.005 0.128 0.293
∆log(revenues) 1,154 0.201 0.321 0.048 0.149 0.292
Firmage 1,189 16.102 13.107 8.000 14.000 21.000
Proﬁtability (ROA) 1,142 0.191 0.180 0.088 0.176 0.278
Loss indicator 1,175 0.070 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cash ﬂow 1,156 0.194 0.231 0.095 0.168 0.267
Fixed asset investment 1,156 0.083 0.193 0.005 0.025 0.085
Fixed assets_assets 1,171 0.180 0.205 0.027 0.097 0.272
Bank loan indicator 1,189 0.538 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
Bank loan_assets 1,189 0.118 0.169 0.000 0.025 0.197
Bank cash_assets 1,189 0.184 0.182 0.035 0.129 0.274
Dividend indicator 1,189 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
Bankruptcy probability 1,189 0.008 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.008
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) 1,179 0.009 0.404 -0.176 0.020 0.212
∆log(revenues) 1,175 -0.064 0.482 -0.208 -0.006 0.175
Proﬁtability (ROA) 1,160 0.133 0.148 0.047 0.121 0.206
Loss indicator 1,160 0.159 0.297 0.000 0.000 0.500
Cash ﬂow 1,179 0.122 0.139 0.047 0.111 0.193
∆Cash ﬂow 1,146 -0.071 0.210 -0.133 -0.051 0.009
Fixed asset investment 1,179 0.050 0.091 0.005 0.021 0.062
∆Bank loan_assets 1,179 0.005 0.088 -0.014 0.000 0.004
∆Bank cash_assets 1,179 0.014 0.103 -0.025 0.001 0.044
Dividend indicator 901 0.364 0.429 0.000 0.000 1.000
Exchange rates 2007 2008 2009
USD/NOK 5.86 5.64 6.28
EUR/NOK 8.02 8.22 8.73
47
Table 5: Firm Investment. The table reports logit regression results. The reported coeﬃcients are discrete eﬀects
of change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. For continuous variables the reported coeﬃcients are marginal
eﬀects. The dependent variables are based on: For columns (1)-(3) the answer to the survey question of
how the crisis aﬀected the ﬁrm's investment in plant, machinery and equipment ("PME"); and columns
(4)-(6) use the answer to the survey question of how the crisis aﬀected the ﬁrm's investment in buildings.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the survey answers are -3, -2 or -1, and zero if the answers are 0,
1, 2, 3 or not relevant. The explanatory variables that are based on survey question responses are equal
to one if the response indicated a decline in the variable, and zero otherwise. Accounting variables are
normalised by the ﬁrm's total assets. The observations are at the ﬁrm level. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduction in Investment in PME Investment in buildings
Credit availability 0.203∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032)
Output demand 0.249∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Output prices 0.102∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.027)
Export demand 0.089∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.050
(0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034)
∆Cash ﬂowcrisis -0.176
∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.048 -0.039
(0.070) (0.069) (0.059) (0.059)
N 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,062 1,062 1,062
Eﬀects of discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Marginal eﬀects for continuous variable.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Overlap of unconstrained ﬁrms between sorting criteria. The table shows the number of sample
ﬁrms belonging to the unconstrained group of both the horizontal and vertical category. The unconstrained
group is group 1 for the Whited and Wu (2006) criteria, group 2 for the dividend payment and group 4
for the size and ﬁxed assets ratio criteries.
Size Whited and Wu (2006) Dividend payment Fixed assets ratio
Size 296
Whited and Wu (2006) 210 289
Dividend payment 163 238 629
Fixed assets ratio 84 76 146 292
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Table 7: Summary Statistics. In Panel A, ﬁrms are sorted into quartiles by ﬁrm size (total assets). In Panel B,
ﬁrms are sorted into quartiles by the Whited and Wu (2006) index: −0.0914 CF− 0.062DIV+ 0.021LTD−
0.044ASSETS + 0.1024 ISG − 0.0354 SG. In panel C, ﬁrms are grouped by whether they paid an ordinary
dividend for the accounting year 2007. Panel D groups ﬁrms by sorting according to their ﬁxed assets to
total assets ratio.
Panel A: Firms sorted into quartiles by total assets.
mean 1 (smallest) 2 3 4 (largest)
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Assets 5,497 10,900 21,939 503,268
Revenues 17,100 27,687 50,610 331,855
∆log(assets) 0.148 0.160 0.191 0.178
∆log(revenues) 0.218 0.188 0.199 0.201
Firmage 12.473 14.795 18.091 19.064
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.196 0.204 0.194 0.167
Loss indicator 0.089 0.064 0.072 0.054
Cash ﬂow 0.198 0.197 0.203 0.178
Fixed asset investment 0.083 0.084 0.075 0.090
Fixed assets_assets 0.153 0.191 0.172 0.206
Bank loan indicator 0.517 0.532 0.540 0.564
Bank loan_assets 0.109 0.128 0.107 0.128
Bank cash_assets 0.246 0.201 0.181 0.105
Dividend indicator 0.460 0.582 0.523 0.551
Bankruptcy probability 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.006
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) 0.060 0.006 0.008 -0.038
∆log(revenues) -0.014 -0.038 -0.093 -0.113
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.139 0.143 0.127 0.121
Loss indicator 0.197 0.141 0.171 0.129
Cash ﬂow 0.133 0.133 0.117 0.106
∆Cash ﬂow -0.061 -0.067 -0.084 -0.073
Fixed asset investment 0.055 0.051 0.046 0.048
∆Bank loan_assets 0.014 0.012 0.000 -0.005
∆Bank cash_assets 0.028 0.008 0.017 0.004
Dividend indicator 0.386 0.380 0.359 0.318
Crisis survey responses
Firm output demand 0.553 0.669 0.687 0.797
Firm output prices 0.377 0.448 0.449 0.537
Firm export demand 0.115 0.145 0.176 0.286
Credit availability 0.195 0.221 0.199 0.309
Investment in plant,
machinery and equipment 0.266 0.311 0.333 0.405
Investment in buildings 0.188 0.205 0.208 0.298
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Panel B: Firms sorted into quartiles by the Whited and Wu (2006) index.
(less constrained) (more constrained)
mean 1 2 3 4
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Assets 502,395 24,189 14,395 7,801
Revenues 322,537 51,008 32,874 21,900
∆log(assets) 0.209 0.194 0.144 0.123
∆log(revenues) 0.237 0.206 0.179 0.183
Firmage 19.671 15.542 16.609 13.771
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.221 0.234 0.199 0.106
Loss indicator 0.021 0.042 0.073 0.138
Cash ﬂow 0.228 0.241 0.197 0.103
Fixed asset investment 0.085 0.081 0.085 0.079
Fixed assets_assets 0.187 0.169 0.185 0.187
Bankloan indicator 0.509 0.521 0.554 0.576
Bank loan_assets 0.099 0.101 0.119 0.155
Bankcash_assets 0.140 0.205 0.209 0.185
Dividend indicator 0.824 0.764 0.509 0.042
Bankruptcy probability 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.016
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) -0.011 -0.012 0.013 0.058
∆log(revenues) -0.076 -0.095 -0.070 -0.022
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.165 0.149 0.135 0.085
Loss indicator 0.099 0.128 0.165 0.234
Cash ﬂow 0.140 0.135 0.132 0.085
∆Cash ﬂow -0.090 -0.106 -0.064 -0.019
Fixed asset investment 0.046 0.050 0.050 0.057
∆Bank loan_assets -0.003 0.009 0.000 0.013
∆Bank cash_assets 0.008 0.004 0.018 0.027
Dividend indicator 0.494 0.483 0.401 0.160
Crisis survey responses
Firm output demand 0.761 0.724 0.662 0.573
Firm output prices 0.516 0.433 0.457 0.401
Firm export demand 0.245 0.159 0.155 0.149
Credit availability 0.274 0.178 0.220 0.236
Investment in plant,
machinery and equipment 0.379 0.325 0.313 0.300
Investment in buildings 0.258 0.222 0.197 0.221
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Panel C: Firms grouped by whether they paid dividend for 2007.
mean 0 (no dividend) 1 (dividend)
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Assets 70,606 192,117
Revenues 89,507 121,631
∆log(assets) 0.161 0.176
∆log(revenues) 0.211 0.193
Firmage 15.845 16.331
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.116 0.255
Loss indicator 0.128 0.018
Cash ﬂow 0.125 0.254
Fixed asset investment 0.096 0.072
Fixed assets_assets 0.198 0.165
Bank loan indicator 0.579 0.502
Bank loan_assets 0.146 0.093
Bank cash_assets 0.157 0.207
Dividend indicator 0.000 1.000
Bankruptcy probability 0.014 0.002
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) 0.015 0.004
∆log(revenues) -0.069 -0.061
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.084 0.176
Loss indicator 0.219 0.107
Cash ﬂow 0.085 0.155
∆Cash ﬂow -0.042 -0.097
Fixed asset investment 0.054 0.046
∆Bank loan_assets 0.005 0.005
∆Bank cash_assets 0.020 0.009
Dividend indicator 0.144 0.605
Crisis survey responses
Firm output demand 0.656 0.693
Firm output prices 0.446 0.457
Firm export demand 0.203 0.159
Credit availability 0.256 0.208
Investment in plant,
machinery and equipment 0.339 0.319
Investment in buildings 0.234 0.213
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Panel D: Sorted by ﬁxed assets to assets ratio.
(lowest) (highest)
mean 1 2 3 4
Pre-crisis ﬁrm characteristics
Assets 173,417 216,437 56,668 96,589
Revenues 95,060 127,581 102,764 101,845
∆log(assets) 0.215 0.160 0.154 0.149
∆log(revenues) 0.236 0.197 0.204 0.170
Firmage 15.154 16.498 15.177 17.449
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.230 0.205 0.184 0.144
Loss indicator 0.055 0.058 0.072 0.092
Cash ﬂow 0.211 0.196 0.186 0.183
Fixed asset investment 0.011 0.036 0.089 0.195
Fixed assets_assets 0.011 0.057 0.166 0.489
Bank loan indicator 0.314 0.464 0.590 0.771
Bank loan_assets 0.056 0.087 0.108 0.217
Bank cash_assets 0.243 0.185 0.185 0.123
Dividend indicator 0.570 0.553 0.498 0.500
Bankruptcy probability 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008
Crisis performance comparison
∆log(assets) -0.046 0.014 0.038 0.032
∆log(revenues) -0.095 -0.051 -0.056 -0.053
Proﬁtability (ROA) 0.155 0.143 0.119 0.113
Loss indicator 0.139 0.155 0.178 0.166
Cash ﬂow 0.105 0.121 0.123 0.141
∆Cash ﬂow -0.108 -0.075 -0.061 -0.041
Fixed asset investment 0.020 0.036 0.063 0.079
∆Bank loan_assets 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.002
∆Bank cash_assets 0.003 0.020 0.014 0.019
Dividend indicator 0.390 0.394 0.323 0.352
Crisis survey responses
Firm output demand 0.721 0.714 0.682 0.590
Firm output prices 0.467 0.441 0.484 0.426
Firm export demand 0.181 0.165 0.211 0.164
Credit availability 0.240 0.193 0.259 0.240
Investment in plant,
machinery and equipment 0.302 0.340 0.342 0.323
Investment in buildings 0.223 0.171 0.249 0.243
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Table 8: Eﬀect of Credit Availability on Investment by ex ante Financial Constraints. The table reports
logit regression estimates for an indicator variable equal to one if the answer to the survey question about
changes in access to credit during the crisis indicates a reduction in credit availability (i.e. with response
values -3, -2 or -1). The reported coeﬃcients are eﬀects of discrete changes to the dummy variable from
0 to 1. The left column denotes the dependent variables, which are: (1) indicator variable equal to one
if the answer to the survey question of how the crisis aﬀected the ﬁrm's investment in plant, machinery
and equipment is negative; (2) indicator variable equal to one if the the answer to the survey question of
how the crisis aﬀected the ﬁrm's investment in buildings is negative. All speciﬁcations include the same
explanatory variables as in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5, but only coeﬃcient estimates for the survey-
based credit availability variable are reported. Panel A sorts ﬁrms into quartiles based on ﬁrm total assets,
with group 4 containing the largest ﬁrms. Panel B sorts ﬁrms into quartiles based on the index provided
by Whited and Wu (2006), with group 1 containing the least ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Panel C groups
ﬁrms by whether they made a provision for dividend to equity holders in their 2007 ﬁnancial statement.
Panel D groups ﬁrms by their ﬁxed assets to total assets ratio, with group 4 containing the ﬁrms with the
highest ratio. The observations are at the ﬁrm level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Panel A: Sorted by ﬁrm size.
Dependent (smallest) (largest)
variable 1 2 3 4
Investment in PME 0.056 0.104 0.007 0.290∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072)
Investment in buildings 0.109 0.010 -0.049 0.216∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.058) (0.059) (0.066)
Panel B: Sorted by the Whited and Wu (2006) index.
Dependent (less constrained) (more constrained)
variable 1 2 3 4
Investment in PME 0.236∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗ -0.049 0.073
(0.072) (0.081) (0.067) (0.069)
Investment in buildings 0.177∗∗∗ 0.117 0.034 -0.018
(0.066) (0.074) (0.057) (0.054)
Panel C: Sorted by whether they paid dividend for 2007.
Dependent (no dividend) (dividend)
variable 1 2
Investment in PME 0.082 0.155∗∗
(0.053) (0.055)
Investment in buildings 0.014 0.141∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.050)
Panel D: Sorted by ﬁxed assets to assets ratio.
Dependent (lowest) (highest)
variable 1 2 3 4
Investment in PME -0.003 0.100 0.110 0.274∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.079) (0.076) (0.078)
Investment in buildings 0.026 0.079 0.094 0.078
(0.059) (0.062) (0.070) (0.064)
Eﬀects of discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Marginal eﬀects for continuous variable
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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